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Constituting the dêmoi democratically
Abstract
The original constitution of the dêmos by democratic means (dêmos problem) is a
fundamental problem for normative democratic theory. In this paper, I make an assessment of
different solutions to the dêmos problem that have been presented in recent literature. I find
that none of them is adequate, and thus hold that the dêmos problem remains unresolved. At
the end of the paper, I propose a constellation in which multiple dêmoi are thought to be
constituted at the same time. I show that this leads to a mitigation of the negative
consequences that are implied in the proposed solutions analysed in previous parts of the
paper. Constituting the dêmos according to the democratic ideal is more expedient under the
conditions of a large number of individuals having the option to form a plurality of dêmoi.
This overall conclusion means that the democratic legitimacy of the dêmos itself is critically
dependent on a relational setting of relatively open but independent dêmoi. The relations
between dêmoi and the freedom of movement among them is thus not something which is
added to ideal democratic theory as an external and foreign element reducing the legitimacy
of a democracy. Rather, the norm that states that there should be multiple dêmoi that openly
relate to each other is actually part of the hard core of democratic legitimacy.
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Constituting the Dêmoi Democratically 
 
Francis Cheneval, University of Zurich 
 
 
Abstract 
The original constitution of the dêmos by democratic means (dêmos problem) is a fundamental 
problem for normative democratic theory. In this paper, I make an assessment of different solutions 
to the dêmos problem that have been presented in recent literature. I find that none of them is 
adequate, and thus hold that the dêmos problem remains unresolved. At the end of the paper, I 
propose a constellation in which multiple dêmoi are thought to be constituted at the same time. I 
show that this leads to a mitigation of the negative consequences that are implied in the proposed 
solutions analysed in previous parts of the paper. Constituting the dêmos according to the democ-
ratic ideal is more expedient under the conditions of a large number of individuals having the option 
to form a plurality of dêmoi. This overall conclusion means that the democratic legitimacy of the 
dêmos itself is critically dependent on a relational setting of relatively open but independent dêmoi. 
The relations between dêmoi and the freedom of movement among them is thus not something 
which is added to ideal democratic theory as an external and foreign element reducing the legiti-
macy of a democracy. Rather, the norm that states that there should be multiple dêmoi that openly 
relate to each other is actually part of the hard core of democratic legitimacy. 
 
I. Introduction 
1. The original constitution of the dêmos by democratic means is a fundamental problem for de-
mocratic theory.1 After a period of relative calm, recent discussions on a global dêmos2, on a hu-
man right to democracy3, and on a right to secession4 and migration5 have been directly or indi-
rectly instrumental in putting the ‘dêmos problem’ back on the agenda of academic publishing. 6  
Authors have attempted solutions or given differentiated accounts of the problem. Robert Goodin 
and many others7 find that the ‘all affected interests’ principle is “the best principled basis upon 
which to constitute the dêmos”.8 David Miller rejects this solution,9 but agrees with Goodin and oth-
ers who assert that the impossibility of solving the dêmos problem with democratic procedure does 
                                                 
1 In the words of Ivor Jennings: “[t]he people cannot decide until someone decides who are the people” 
(Jennings 1956: 56). 
2 List & Koenig-Archibugi 2010. 
3 Franck 1992; Bernstein 2007; Altman & Heath Wellman 2009, p. 31-34. 
4 Buchanan 2003, p. 235; p. 256ff. 
5 Abizadeh 2008, p. 45-8. 
6 Dahl 1989, p. 207. For an assessment see Miller 2009. In recent debates, authors have used different ter-
minology to express the problem. Whelan (1983) has called it the “boundary problem” of democracy. But, as 
Goodin pointed out (2007: 40, n.1), he did not clearly distinguish between the question of membership and 
the question of territory of the dêmos. Dahl (1979) and Shklar (1991) have called it the problem of inclusion. 
This may lead to misunderstanding. The problem is not the inclusion of new members into an already exist-
ing dêmos, but the constitution of the dêmos in the first place (Goodin 2007: 41, n.1). In more neutral terms 
Arrhenius (2005) speaks of the “dêmos problem”  [He also uses the term “the boundary problem” – for a 
terminological discussion see his “The Democratic Boundary Problem“] and Goodin (2007) of “the problem of 
constituting the dêmos”. Habermas (2001, p. 144) summarizes the problem as “endless circle of self-
constitution” [translation by the author]. 
7 See Martí 2006, p. 28. See Arrhenius 2009. 
8 Goodin 2007, p. 64. For a recent critical assessment of the principle see Näsström 2011. 
9 Miller 2009. 
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not in itself imply that it cannot be solved within democratic theory more broadly speaking. Miller 
offers an analysis of the ambivalence of democratic theory regarding the dêmos problem – he calls 
it the question of democracy’s domain – and he shows how different answers to the problem de-
pend on different conceptions of democracy. These answers are not unrelated and Miller explores 
the common ground which different conceptions of democracy share in dealing with the problem of 
the scope of the dêmos.10  
 
2. In this paper, I make an assessment of different solutions to the dêmos problem which have 
been presented in recent literature. I find that none of them is adequate, and thus hold that the 
dêmos problem remains unresolved. At the end of the paper, I propose a constellation in which 
multiple dêmoi are thought to be constituted at the same time. I show that this leads to a mitigation 
of the negative consequences which are implied in the proposed solutions analysed in previous 
parts of the paper. Constituting the dêmos according to the democratic ideal is more expedient 
under the conditions of a large number of individuals having the option to form a plurality of dêmoi. 
The option of forming multiple dêmoi and the increase in numbers of foundational members does 
not solve the dêmos problem as such. However, a dêmoi-based setting mitigates some of the 
problems resulting from the application of the principles we have discussed. It can work in favour of 
competence-based solutions of the dêmos problem, it increases options of free choice in accep-
tance-based settings of dêmos formations, and it offers a solution to minorities in impact-based 
solutions. Furthermore, the setting of multiple dêmoi reduces or even redeems factual exclusion. 
Based on conceptual considerations, I will argue that the acceptance-based solution combined 
with a foundational setting of multiple-dêmoi is the least unsatisfactory solution to the dêmos prob-
lem.  
 This overall conclusion means that the democratic legitimacy of the dêmos itself is critically 
dependent on a relational setting of relatively open but independent dêmoi. The relations between 
dêmoi and the freedom of movement among them is thus not something which is added to ideal 
democratic theory as an external and foreign element reducing the legitimacy of a democracy. 
Rather, the norm which states that there should be multiple dêmoi that openly relate to each other 
is actually part of the hard core of democratic legitimacy. 
At this stage it is necessary to explain that the problem focus of this paper must be distin-
guished from several other problems dealing with the dêmos in democratic theory. Firstly, I do not 
discuss the factual genesis of the dêmos or the question of the origins of dêmoi in history. Sec-
ondly, I do not address the question of posterior inclusion, in other words the question which crite-
ria should inform the inclusion of new members in the existing dêmoi. Thirdly, I do not discuss the 
legitimacy of the occupation of a territory by a dêmos, only its composition regarding membership 
(ratione personae).  
                                                 
10 Miller 2009, p. 204. 
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  After a section on conceptual clarifications (II), I discuss the proposed solutions which are 
found in the literature by identifying the three broad types of solution to which I think the complexity 
of the debate can be reduced: the third section of the paper presents solutions based on criteria of 
competence of members (III); the fourth section discusses the principle of mutual acceptance of 
the members of the dêmos (IV); and the fifth section deals with the affected interests principle as a 
solution for the dêmos problem (V). In the concluding section (VI) I remark on the state of the ques-
tion based on the preceding sections.   
 
An issue I leave to one side in this paper concerns the democratic bootstrapping of the 
dêmos, in other words the question of whether an undemocratically constituted dêmos can recon-
stitute itself democratically through a process of self-correction. This is an extremely fascinating 
question, but, as Goodin has pointed out11, it ultimately begs the question of which principles and 
which ideal constellation should guide the process. In other words, we would be taken back to 
square one of the problem discussed here; namely the problem of according to which principle the 
dêmos can be constituted democratically in ideal theory.  
 
II. Conceptual Clarifications 
1. Before analyzing possible solutions to the dêmos problem, we need first to clarify what is meant 
by ’dêmos’ and ‘democratic’. Any concept of the dêmos will necessarily be informed by a certain 
conception of democracy which will in turn have implications for the determination of democracy’s 
domain. Given that our primary aim here is the solution of the dêmos problem, and not the settle-
ment of differences between conceptions of democracy, it does not make sense to defend a single 
definition of the dêmos in this paper. In view of our main objective to know whether the dêmos 
problem can be solved at all and how, I presuppose a minimal  definition of the dêmos. For the 
purpose of my argument it suffices to hold that any principle based solution of the dêmos problem 
has to enable the constitution of a dêmos which at least corresponds to a minimal definition of the 
dêmos. In the chosen definition, I focus on a political notion of the dêmos and thereby exclude 
clubs, unions, companies etc. It makes sense to distinguish between the dêmos as an authoritative 
political body with far reaching competencies to make and impose general rules and other types of 
societal groups who do not have this specific legal and political competence. Submission to the 
rules of clubs, unions, companies etc. is optional and the clubs, companies, etc. themselves are 
submitted to law in general. Membership and participation in those groups is thus to be considered 
a different normative problem. 
The minimal definition of the dêmos needs to include both the compositional as well as the 
performative aspect of the dêmos, in other words it needs to determine the group of individuals 
forming the dêmos as well as its special capacities.12 While it is adequate to distinguish a composi-
                                                 
11 Goodin 2007, p. 44-5. 
12 List & Koenig-Archibugi 2010, p. 78. 
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tional from a performative concept of the dêmos, it is also clear that performative necessities of the 
dêmos determine compositional criteria. In other words, we cannot presuppose that there is a pure 
membership criterion which is totally independent from the necessary performance of the dêmos. 
For the purpose of our argument, I propose the following working definition of the dêmos:  
 
A dêmos is a group of human individuals engaged in generally binding collective action through 
common institutional practices.  
 
One might ask if a definition of the dêmos does not already represent a solution to the dêmos prob-
lem? But the dêmos problem is not a definitional problem. Rather it puts the question of how to 
constitute the dêmos democratically. To answer this question, we need some conceptual guidance 
on what we want to understand by ‘demos’ and ‘democratic’. The minimal dêmos definition does 
not offer a solution to the problem, but it limits the scope of possible solutions. A definition of a car 
will not solve the problem of how it can be built in the most adequate manner, but it will help you 
decide if what you built is a car. The above definition therefore marks the conceptual threshold 
above which a solution to the dêmos problem can be sought. 
 
2. At the centre of recent debate on the dêmos problem stands the distinction between democratic 
procedure or method in a narrow sense and a broader meaning of the normative ideal of democ-
racy.13 While it is evident that the dêmos is logically and temporally prior to democratic procedure 
or method, and hence that there is a circularity problem in applying demos-based democratic pro-
cedure to the original constitution of the demos. Several authors argue that it does not follow from 
this that democratic theory cannot deal with the dêmos problem in reference to principles which 
uphold the broader normative ideal of democracy.14  
To clarify what we mean by ‘democratic’, we ought to distinguish between two procedural 
meanings on the one hand, and a reference to the normative ideal of democracy on the other 
hand: 
 
democratic1 qualifies a decision making procedure in which every individual participates and has 
the right to reject any decision of any other individual or group 
 
democratic2 qualifies a procedure of decision making in which individuals hold participating rights 
and are subjected to collective decision making rules  
 
                                                 
13 Arrhenius 2005, pp. 2-4. 
14 Arrhenius 2005; Goodin 2007; Miller 2009. 
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democratic3 qualifies the normative ideal of a social system as being based on individual freedom, 
as well as participatory, inclusive, egalitarian, deliberative, transparent, free from domination and 
discrimination, and fair.  
 
It is important to mention that a solution to the demos problem which excludes participatory choice 
and mutual acceptance on the basis of some abstract democratic ideal is unsatisfactory because 
this will require an idealized authority of determining the scope of application of the ideal. Sec-
ondly, it is not obvious that any procedural solution of the demos problem will be circular. This de-
pends on whether we conceive of the procedure as collective choice procedure (democratic2) or as 
individual mutual acceptance to which everybody would be entitled (democratic1). As collective 
choice procedure of a dêmos, any democratic dêmos constitution is circular. As procedure of indi-
vidual mutual acceptance this is not the case. In this case we do not presuppose a dêmos, only a 
procedure in which every individual has the same right to choose its fellow citizens to constitute the 
demos. The dêmos is not presupposed, only a participatory procedure of individual (and not of 
collective) choice. It is therefore a mistake to exclude the procedural notion of democracy from the 
solution of the demos-problem a priori in the name of the abstract democratic ideal. Quite to the 
contrary, any solution based on a notion of democratic1 will be more acceptable because it does 
not require a further imagined or real authority of choosers. It will not beg the question of who 
chooses the choosers. 
Hence, there are general problems involved in the third meaning of democracy as norma-
tive ideal (democratic3). Detached from actual participatory decision-making, we do not seem to be 
able to precisely define the ideal of democracy. It remains rather fuzzy and includes countervailing 
principles, such as freedom and equality, voice and empowerment.15 Secondly, a complete solu-
tion of the dêmos problem does not only answer the question according to what ideal principle in-
dividuals ought to be allowed to adhere to the dêmos and participate in its actions. The solution of 
the demos problem also has to tell us something about whether people choose themselves, or 
whether we have to assume some ideal selector, be it an individual or committee. 
 
III. Competence-Based Solutions to the Dêmos Problem 
1. The Condorcet-Jury-Theorem (CJT) offers a good entry point for assessing the possibility of a 
competence based solution to the dêmos problem. The CJT states that the probability of a group 
making the right collective decision is higher than the probability of an individual member making 
the right decision, under the conditions that the average competence allowing for a right decision of 
every member is above 50%. In such a case it is also true that the probability of making the right 
collective decision increases with increasing numbers of members and it approaches 100% with an 
infinite number of members. By contrast, if the chance of members making the right decision is 
below 50%, increasing membership reduces the chance of making the right collective decision. As 
                                                 
15 Warren 2009 
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Arrhenius has pointed out, if one applies this theorem to the dêmos problem the following principle 
can be formulated accordingly: 
 
P1 “Inclusions and exclusions [in the dêmos] should be based on whether it is likely that the voter 
in question is better than chance at getting the right answer”.16 
 
Clearly, such a solution tries to solve the dêmos problem through a performative approach. The 
required performance of finding the right answer determines the compositional criterion. The prob-
ability of having a specific epistemic expertise qualifies people to form part of the dêmos.  
The CJT is not the only competence-based solution offered to the dêmos problem. Jürgen Haber-
mas  
proposes that, apart from choosing freely which dêmos they want to belong to, potential members 
need to be able to participate in practical discourses.17 In other words, they need to be able to give 
reasonable justifications for actions and be able to put themselves in the position of others. Hence 
the following principle can be formulated accordingly: 
 
P2 Inclusions and exclusions in the dêmos should be based on whether it is likely that the member 
in question is able to engage in practical reasoning. 
 
This principle is less technocratic and less rigid than the CJT version. It does not presuppose that 
all political questions are like problems of mathematics where the right answer is given. Rather it 
presupposes an ability to engage in deliberation, to learn from others, to be critical about conven-
tional wisdom, to put oneself in the position of others etc.  But at the end of the day, the principle 
can be interpreted as a variation of CJT. All we have to do is replace “whether it is likely that the 
voter in question is better than chance at getting the right answer” in P1 with “whether it is likely 
that the voter is capable of practical reasoning”. P2 is thus a variant of P1, it just specifies the re-
quired competence. 
 
2. What can we make of these proposed competence based solutions to the dêmos problem? A 
first point I would like to make is that the CJT based solution presupposes a strong version of the 
epistemic conception of democracy. According to the CJT, democracy is considered to be a delib-
erative and decisional system dedicated to theoretical and moral truth and to procedures that are 
considered to be the best “truth trackers”.18 It is beyond the remit of this paper to determine 
whether this conception of democracy is adequate or complete and to consider what we are to 
                                                 
16 Formulation taken from Arrhenius (2005, p. 10) who of course does not adhere to this competence based 
solution. 
17 Habermas 
18 List & Goodin 2001. 
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understand by ‘truth’ or ‘correct decision’.19 Suffice it to say that criticism has been made of the 
epistemic conception of democracy formulated from value based and/or relativist points of view20 
but that is not the point here. 
More importantly, even among supporters of epistemic democracy, there are different under-
standings of episteme and not all of them hold that democracy is essentially truth tracking. Joshua 
Cohen sees democracy’s normative essence as lying in public deliberation which does not track 
the truth in the sense of the correspondence theory of truth, but rather establishes “mutual justifi-
ability”.21 We can understand mutual justifiability as an additional criterion to objective truth and 
conceive of democracy as combining the quest for the right answer with the quest for free social 
acceptance of the right answer.22 In such a case, the CJT does not stand against an ideal of de-
mocracy understood as establishing mutual justifiability or an inter-subjective standard of rightness. 
It is just incomplete with regard to the full normative advantage of democracy. Regardless, we can 
leave the question of the adequacy of an epistemic conception of democracy open because there 
are two more direct reasons to reject the CJT as a solution to the dêmos problem.23  
Firstly, a dêmos lying above the minimal definition will be constituted by P1 if, and only if, the 
same group of individuals has more than a 50% chance of getting the right answer regarding a 
large variety of decisions to be taken. We know from recent studies on the CJT that the individuals 
do not need to have the exact same factor of probability of getting the right answer. It is enough if 
they have an average probability factor of above 50%, bearing in mind that they can also influence 
each other or base their decision on interrelated information.24 This means that those with exper-
tise could influence others, or those who do not have the expertise could leave the decision up to 
the experts while still forming part of the ‘jury’. Even so, political decisions would include a vast 
range of problems which will require the application of very different expertise. Whilst it is not im-
possible it is highly implausible that a dêmos capable of sustained agency will be constituted on 
the basis of the CJT as an original compositional criterion. Still, one could argue that this does not 
rule out P1 in a setting of ideal theory. A second counterargument is more compelling on that level:  
Secondly, the solution of the dêmos problem will have to answer two questions. The first ques-
tion is according to which criteria the members are worthy to be members of the demos. The sec-
ond question is who should identify those who are worthy. P1 and P2 indicate a criterion but do not 
indicate who choses. Who decides who is able to engage in practical reasoning, and what we 
                                                 
19 For a comprehensive defense and differentiated discussion see Martí 2006. 
20 Maybe most prominently by Richard Rorty (1993). Jane Mansbridge (2006) has made clear that democ-
racy is about overcoming conflicts of legitimate material self-interest. Understanding material self-interest is 
as contaminating for the political as it is wrong. This position undermines one major goal of democracy which 
is to produce well-reasoned and fair decisions in conditions that reflect as closely as possible the equality 
and freedom of each individual. Democratic decisions can be related to values which are not epistemic, i.e. 
they hold no moral rightness, but are rather a question of custom, aesthetics, and free choice. 
21 Cohen 1989. 
22 Lafont 2006, p. 8. 
23 Further discuss David Estlund’s approach to deliberative democracy and CJT in his recent book on this 
subject 
24 Berg 1993; Ladha 1992 
 8
should understand by practical reasoning? Self-selection undermines the CJT and any compe-
tence based criterion, because it undermines independent confirmation of expertise. The expertise 
of a group could be at tipping point and a self-selected new member of the group who does not 
have the required expertise could turn the decision from right to wrong. Moreover, P1 also begs the 
question of who decides the agenda setting of the ‘jury’? Overall, the distinction between the gen-
eral democratic ideal and democratic method does not help in the case of competence based prin-
ciples of dêmos constitution because the choice of the choosers is being left open and prey to infi-
nite regression. P1 and P2 beg the question of selection of the selection committee ad infinitum or 
lead to self-selection and thereby undermine a competence based determination of the dêmos. 
Acceptance based solutions seem to solve the problem of choosing the choosers by mutual accep-
tance. Let us see how far this can take us in a solution of the demos problem. 
 
 
III. Acceptance-Based Solutions of the Dêmos Problem 
 
1. The acceptance based solution to the dêmos problem has been formulated in the following 
terms:  
 
P3 “The dêmos ought to consist of all and only of those persons each of whom is not rejected by 
any of the others as a member.”25 
 
This solution presents a radically democratic club model and demands mutual recognition among 
all members. It is strictly compositional and leaves performance based and impact based consid-
erations to one side. At first, the principle looks very attractive and genuinely democratic. Goodin 
has criticized it for being too restrictive and eventually leaving many individuals stateless.26 This 
criticism implies the acceptance of a human right to belong to a people. If such a right exists, then 
there is no demos problem at all because everybody would have the right to belong to the dêmos. 
We thus need to ask if there are not any other reasons to reject P3.  
One can give P3 a voluntaristic or rationalistic reading. In the rationalistic version, the prin-
ciple is incomplete because it begs the question of what the reasonable criteria of inclusion and 
exclusion are which should guide the decisions of the members in accepting each other.27 The 
same is true if the principle is given a procedural reading in order to resolve the problem of scale. 
Procedural principles would be needed which can help scale-up the scope of the dêmos without 
forgoing its basic intention to have only acceptable or at least only reasonably acceptable mem-
bers. The latter begs the question of reasonable principles for such up-scaling. The element of free 
and open recognition by the members is thus an important aspect of a democratic constitution of 
                                                 
25 Whelan 1983, p. 24-28; Goodin 2007, p. 42. 
26 Goodin 2007, p. 42. 
27 Goodin 2007, p. 42. 
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the dêmos, but it is in need of more criteria if the violation of democratic principles such as non-
discrimination, equal treatment, and fair procedure are to be avoided. 
In the voluntaristic reading, members choose members wilfully. No further reasoning and 
procedure is demanded. There is no stipulation provided by the principle that decisions on mem-
bership which are in contradiction with other democratic principles such as fair procedure, non-
discrimination, or equal treatment, would be illegitimate. X could reject Y on any grounds, even 
grave racial or ethnic discrimination, or complete arbitrariness. The voluntaristic reading of this 
principle does not exclude applications that would be considered non-democratic in the light of 
other definitional elements of democracy. If these consequences are to be avoided, the principle 
needs further specifications. 
There is yet another problem with the principle which represents the most compelling rea-
son to reject it as a solution to the dêmos problem. I refer to it as the paradox of self-exclusion. If 
read as a constituting (as opposed to re-constituting) principle, P3 does not presuppose a group of 
members inviting new members. Rather it assumes a foundational situation in which potential 
members choose each other openly and freely. Let us assume A, B, C, D, and E all want to form a 
dêmos. A, B, and C accept each other and they also accept D and E, but D does not accept E. E 
therefore will not accept D or will make his acceptance of D depend on D accepting him. By not 
accepting E, D thus excludes himself. The dêmos will thus only be constituted by A, B, and C. If D 
and E want to form part of the dêmos the rational thing for them to do is to accept each other (and 
all others). In the foundational situation and given that A, B, C, D, and E all want to be part of the 
dêmos, it is thus rational from the point of view of every potential member to accept all the others in 
order not to be excluded, even if they would choose not to do so under the absence of constraints. 
Every member has an unconstrained choice only if the choice is done secretly or if the dêmos and 
membership is already constituted and members accept new ones (a situation of invitation).  
The point is that the interpretation and consequences of this principle depend on a previous 
determination if a constitutive or invitational (re-constitutive) situation is presupposed. The decision 
of the foundational act of the dêmos is to be distinguished from the decision of the members rec-
ognizing each other. Once the decision of the foundational act is taken, the members are left with 
no free choice of fellow members, or else they have to constitute the dêmos secretly and by with-
holding information from each other regarding their choice. The foundational version of the princi-
ple is thus not unconditionally democratic and certainly not as utopian as is seems. Founding 
members really have no other choice than to accept each other or to engage in secrecy. In the 
latter case, some members might be excluded even though they have accepted all the others, and 
some members will be legitimately part of the dêmos even though they might have rejected some-
one for absurd reasons. If the others members knew those reasons, they might want to reject that 
person. In other words, the secrecy of selection undermines the basic intention of mutual accep-
tance which the principle pretends to realize. In short, P3 cannot be applied in a foundational situa-
tion of the dêmos in a consistent manner.  
 10
 
 
IV. Impact-Based Solutions to the Dêmos Problem 
 
1. In the attempt to solve the dêmos problem, impact based principles play a major role. By ‘impact 
based principles’, I mean principles constituting the dêmos whereby persons are subject to coer-
cion or have interests which are affected by the decisions of the dêmos. In this section, I reject two 
variants of impact based solutions to the dêmos problem Firstly, I demonstrate that a principle ac-
cording to which the dêmos is constituted through coercion by the law is not a viable solution to the 
dêmos problem. Secondly, I show the same for the ‘all affected interests’ principle.  
  
2. The compositional constitution of the dêmos according to an obligation to obey the law can be 
formulated in the following terms:  
 
P4: All who are legally obliged to obey a body of law are entitled to membership in the dêmos de-
ciding the law. 
 
This principle has been dismissed as a solution to the dêmos problem by Goodin.28 The reason 
given is that a “captain of a foreign ship anchored in our harbour; any visitor to our shores; or in-
deed any alien living illegally among us” is obliged by the law.  They are not thereby entitled to be 
members of the dêmos29. Goodin’s argument is sound if the problem we are trying to solve is one 
of an existing demos looking for democratically sound criteria to accept new members. If an alien is 
“living illegally among us” this means that there is already an “us” forming a dêmos. The question 
according to what criteria an existing dêmos, however constituted in the first place, ought to accept 
new members is to be distinguished form the dêmos problem of how to constitute the dêmos de-
mocratically ab origine. The dêmos problem refers to a situation in which the dêmos has to be con-
stituted. Since democracy requires that the legal order be determined by the dêmos and the terri-
tory claimed by the demos and recognized by other dêmoi, presupposing a legal order (or territory) 
puts the wagon before the horse. The dêmos problem requires that neither a dêmos nor a defined 
legal order can be presupposed to exist in the first place. In this setting there is no dêmos nor are 
there visitors or aliens. Hence, it is not clear on what grounds visitors and even aliens without 
proper documentation are visitors and aliens in the first place, nor is it clear how they could be a 
priori excluded from membership in the law making community. Goodin’s refutation would have to 
be based on a solution of the dêmos problem, but that is what we are looking for in the first place. 
While Goodin shows that political obligation does not turn aliens into citizens, his refutation does 
not make clear why submission to the law cannot constitute the status of membership in the law 
                                                 
28 Goodin 2007, p. 42. 
29 Ibid. 
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making community in a foundational situation. It can however be made clear by the following ar-
gument which will now elaborated. 
P4 begs the question of who is obliged to obey a law. This question can be answered by re-
ferring to territory or to membership. If the question is answered referring to membership, the prin-
ciple presupposes membership instead of giving reasons for its democratic constitution. If the prin-
ciple implies that everybody finding themselves on a given territory would be part of the dêmos of 
that territory, the definition of the territory is prior to the constitution of the dêmos and constitutive 
for the dêmos. But who decides on the delimitation of the territory and according to what criteria? 
In any case, that decision would either be made by already existing dêmoi or in a way which is 
non-democratic. So the delimitation of the territory either presupposes the existence of a dêmos (or 
various dêmoi deciding together), or the delimitation of territory is the result of non-democratic pro-
cedures and power struggles.30 In the first case the principle is not constitutive for the dêmos in the 
foundational sense; in the second reading it does not offer a genuinely democratic solution to the 
dêmos problem. 
 
3. The principle stating that those who have their interests affected by a decision should participate 
in its making is old and reputable. It goes back to Roman private law which determined that all 
those who have custody over a person should approve decisions made regarding that person if the 
decision equally affects their authority.31 How such a statement found its way from the intricacies of 
ancient private law to modern democracy theory makes for fascinating reading.32 The history of this 
principle illustrates that certain statements contain a normative surplus which, while not originally 
intended or realized, evolves in the history of interpretation and application. In today’s literature on 
democracy numerous authors hold that the democratic ideal requires the inclusion of all those af-
fected by a decision in the decision making process.33. It seems logical that this principle is also 
advocated as the solution to the dêmos problem.34 While I disagree with this general conclusion, I 
recognize that Goodin has substantially contributed to a better understanding of the ‘all affected 
interests’ principle. Building on his analysis, the following table illustrates how a solution to the 
dêmos problem by the ‘all affected interests’ principle can actually be understood and formulated in 
twelve different variations: 
                                                 
30  Näsström 2011, p. 122. 
31 Necesse est omnes suam auctoritatem praestare ut quod omnes similiter tangit ab omnibus comprobetur. 
(Codex Justinianus, V, 59, 5, 2). 
32 Congar 1958. 
33 See a list of authors in Martí 2006, p.28. 
34 Goodin 2007. 
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 actually 
affected 
only the 
actually af-
fected 
possibly 
affected 
only the 
possibly 
affected 
probably 
affected 
only the pro-
bably affec-
ted 
equal parti-
cipation 
P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
unequal 
participation 
P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 
 
P5: Everyone actually affected by a collective decision should have the right to participate in that 
decision with equal voting power. 
P6: Everyone actually affected by a collective decision and only those actually affected by the deci-
sion should have the right to participate in that decision with equal voting power. 
P7: Everyone possibly affected by a collective decision should have the right to participate in that 
decision with equal voting power. 
P8: Everyone possibly affected by a collective decision and only those possibly affected by the de-
cision should have the right to participate in that decision with equal voting power. 
P9: Everyone probably affected by a collective decision should have the right to participate in that 
decision with equal voting power. 
P10: Everyone probably affected by a collective decision and only those probably affected by the 
decision should have the right to participate in that decision with equal voting power. 
P11: Everyone should have a right to participate in a decision affecting their interests in proportion 
to the degree to which their interests are actually affected. 
P12: Those and only those actually affected should have the right to participate in a decision affect-
ing their interests in proportion to the degree to which their interests are possibly affected. 
P13: Everyone should have the right to participate in a decision affecting their interests in proportion 
to the degree to which their interests are possibly affected. 
P14: Those and only those possibly affected should have the right to participate in a decision affect-
ing their interests in proportion to the degree to which their interests are possibly affected. 
P15: Everyone should have the right to participate in a decision affecting their interests in proportion 
to the degree to which their interests are probably affected. 
P16: Those and only those probably affected should have the right to participate in a decision af-
fecting their interests in proportion to the degree to which their interests are probably affected. 
 
On the basis of analyses in the literature, I see three criteria by which we can eliminate various 
formulations of the ‘all affected interests’ principle as inadequate: 1. political equality; 2. non-
circularity; and 3. non-redundancy. While the two logical standards of -circularity and non-
redundancy are self explanatory, political equality might need justification. The reason it is applied 
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is its closeness to the general democratic ideal. The solution to the dêmos problem cannot be in 
contradiction with fundamental aspects of the democratic ideal. Egalitarianism regarding political 
rights is such a fundamental aspect. Democratic citizenship conveys the idea of an equal status as 
citizen as opposed to the functionally justified hierarchies of civil society and government.  
Defendants of the all affected principle will point out that multi-layered or federal democratic 
systems give people differential voting rights. 35 But differential weights of votes or differential vot-
ing rights according to level of government have to be distinguished from the situation that would 
occur if one attributed voting rights according to the all affected principle. It is clear that voters are 
assigned one vote or no vote for different levels of government. A person living in Fairfax doesn’t 
have a vote in Washington and vice versa but both have a vote in the national election. The point is 
that all persons living in Fairfax have equal voting rights for matters concerning Fairfax and all have 
equal voting rights in national elections. In a presidential election the elector system leads to an 
unequal distribution of weight of the votes. In Wyoming roughly 174.277 inhabitants elect one 
member of the electoral college in a presidential election whereas in Florida it is 675.972 inhabi-
tants. But here too, all votes from Florida have the same weight etc. Thus, all levels of political in-
tegration respect the principle of political equality for the given level. If political communities are 
part of larger political communities composed of political communities, there is unequal weight of 
votes, but this inequality is still equal for each community. 
Attributing participation rights in proportion to affectedness breaks political equality in one 
and the same political community into a myriad of proportionalities. It thereby introduces new forms 
of census giving dangerous powers to the censors who will decide who has what stakes and is 
entitled to what kind of voting power. 36 Proportions of being affected change with every decision. 
We thus end up with a different dêmos for every decision and face the problem that the dêmos has 
to be determined on an ad hoc basis for every decision taken. Arrhenius (2009: 12) responds that 
this objection is only sound regarding the all affected principle as part of a decision method not as 
part of a normative ideal. This is not convincing since we are not talking about the decision method 
but about a criterion on the basis of which one can decide who has the right to participate in the 
decision, never mind the method by which the decisions will be taken. We are talking about a crite-
rion for membership in the decision making community.    
Hence, principles based on proportionality of affectedness do not serve as constitutive prin-
ciple of a sustained dêmos which has any functional value for the practice of democracy.37 The 
principles based on proportionality of affectedness do not constitute a dêmos above the threshold 
of our definition. On these grounds, P11-P16 need to be eliminated as solutions to the dêmos 
problem. 
 
                                                 
35 Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010 
36 See also Gould 2004, p. 175. 
37 Whelan 1983, p. 19. 
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We can further eliminate all those principles referring to those who are ‘actually affected’. As has 
been mentioned by several authors, in order to know who is actually affected by a decision, the 
question decided upon has to be determined and the decision has to be made in the first place.38 
The scope of the decision makers can thus not be determined by the impact of the decision on 
people’s interests. The group of decision makers needs to be designated before the decision (and 
agenda setting) and its impact can only be assessed after the fact. This circularity problem in all 
variants containing “actually affected” triggers the further elimination of P5 and P6. The probability 
of affectedness depends on what are probable agendas and outcomes, with the latter depending 
on the composition of the decision makers.39 The critique of circularity therefore applies in all three 
aspects (probability of agenda, probability of outcome, and probability of affected interest). We thus 
also have to eliminate principles P9 and P10 on the grounds that they lead to circularity. 
 Goodin has argued that the variants which specify that only those who are affected have 
the right to participate can be eliminated as superfluous on the grounds that those who do not have 
their interests affected will vote randomly and distribute their votes equally among all options. They 
will therefore make no difference to the outcome.40 The worry is thus the inclusion of the affected 
not the exclusion of the non-affected. The remaining principle P8 is thus eliminated by Ockham’s 
razor. 
 
P7 which holds that all those who are possibly affected by a decision have a right to participate in 
its making is thus the only formulation of the ‘all affected interests’ principle that remains in tact. 
What does it imply if we recognize its relevance for agenda setting, considerations of outcomes, 
and affected interests? It implies nothing less than that anyone who might possibly be affected by 
any possible outcome of any possible decision arising out of any possible agenda has to be en-
franchised. Everyone in the world and everyone in all possible future worlds should be entitled to 
vote. Goodin draws the conclusion that this form of the ‘all affected interests’ principle is the best 
one for how to constitute the dêmos which anyone has come up with so far. It leads to a “genuinely 
global, timeless democracy”. He puts the burden of proof on those who reject it in the name of 
practicality: “[i]f (as I believe to be the case) the ‘all affected interests’ principle is the best princi-
pled basis upon which to constitute the dêmos, and if (as I have argued) the best interpretation of 
that principle is the expansive “possibilist” form, then it does indeed provide good grounds for think-
ing that (at least in principle) we should give virtually everyone a vote on virtually everything virtu-
ally everywhere in the world”.41 
 
Embracing this principle as solving the problem of constituting the dêmos democratically, however, 
is precipitated and erroneous. Firstly, the possibilist version includes all possible future genera-
                                                 
38 Whelan 1983, p. 17; Gould 2004, p. 177; Goodin 2007, p. 52-53; Miller 2009, p. 215. 
39 Goodin 2007, p. 61. 
40 Goodin 2007, p. 58-9 vs. Dahl 1970, p. 64. 
41 Goodin 2007, p. 64. 
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tions. The problem is that they cannot be enfranchised in any dêmos corresponding to our minimal 
definition. Any taking into account of the interests of future generations is purely hypothetical. The 
dêmos that is constituted by this principle, if a dêmos is constituted at all, is a fiction in which some 
people speak for imagined others who cannot possibly have a voice. In principle, there is nothing 
wrong with fiction and hypothetical reasoning, it is omnipresent in political philosophy and espe-
cially in contractualism. Furthermore, all dêmoi are “imagined communities”42 and “represented” 
rather than “present”.43 But the point with regard to the dêmos problem is that there can be no re-
alization and agency of the dêmos of the possibly affected. Any dêmos, even if it enfranchises all 
living humans, will suffer from the absence of those possibly affected in the future and they proba-
bly (and hopefully for mankind) represent the overwhelming majority. One can also add that hu-
manity means is a natural community against which any normative claim of peoplehood is legiti-
mate.44 Furthermore, as derived from the “all affected” principle humanity is not a “we” it is a third 
person that does not make a claim to form a political community.  The claim in the name of human-
ity is not neutral and competes with any other claim to peoplehood.45 
The standard objection to this extension of the expansive possibilist reading of the ‘all af-
fected interests’ principle to future generations is the non-identity problem. Future people whose 
existence depends on the actions of currently living people cannot have rights vis-à-vis the latter.46 
They thus have no right to belong to the dêmos. If we accept this verdict, our refutation of Goodin’s 
proposal is wrong. However, some authors have tried to refute with reference to the so-called 
threshold conception of harm.47 The possibly affected who are to be taken into account would be 
all those concerned under the threshold conception of harm, whatever that threshold may be. They 
have no direct agency and voice and only a hypothetical representation. The threshold conception 
of harm implies the problem of determining the threshold in the first place. But we do not have to 
materially determine that threshold to make our point. It suffices to assume that an action (or 
inaction) at time t1 causes (allows) either the coming into existence of this person in a sub-
threshold state and that this person would not be in the harmed state had the agent not acted in 
the way s/he did; and furthermore, only if the agent, if he cannot avoid causing harm in this sense, 
does not minimize the harm. The threshold conception of harm considerably reduces the scope the 
all affected principle’s imperative to include future generations in the dêmos.  
However, the situation turns against the all affected principle if we consider the infinity prob-
lem. Cosmopolitan thinkers of the Enlightenment like Leibniz, Wolff, and Kant have contemplated 
an infinite progress of future generations in their cosmopolitan thought.48 When dealing with possi-
ble future generations there is no cut off point which we can reasonably assume. The sun goes out 
                                                 
42 Anderson 1991. 
43 Pitkin 1972. 
44 Näsström 2011, p. 129. 
45 Näsström 2011, p. 129. 
46 Schwartz 1978; Kavka 1982; Parfit 1984, pp. 351-79. 
47 See Meyer 2008. For further reading see Shiffrin 1999; McMahan 1998, pp 223-29.  
48 Cheneval 2005, pp. 19-74 & 196-201. 
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in five billion years, but by that time our fellow future humans might have travelled to another solar 
system. There is infinite progress in the notion of generation, i.e. of one generation generating the 
next and so forth. As a consequence, P7 does not constitute any dêmos at all and it asks us to 
take into account an infinity of possible interests. This implies that any real existing dêmos is dis-
criminatory and disenfranchises possible interests of possible future humans. As a consequence, 
even if we concede that ought implies can, we cannot argue that the world-dêmos would come 
closest to enfranchising an infinite number of possible interests. Furthermore, the hypothetical na-
ture of presumed interests of future generations might be better represented by a very small 
enlightened elite than by a world-dêmos. In sum, P7 is a critical, unattainable ideal of a ‘kingdom of 
ends, not a constitutive principle of the dêmos. As a critical ideal it cannot be refuted; as a constitu-
tive principle of the dêmos it simply does not apply. 
 
Thridly, we have to address the question of whether the ‘all affected interests’ principle actually 
defines a right to participate in a decision or a right to membership. The two have to be distin-
guished and the latter is not implied by the former. If club X takes a decision that will possibly affect 
the interests of members and non-members, we could argue that according to P7 this decision 
ought to be taken by all those who are possibly affected. It does not follow from P7 that all those 
who are possibly affected have the right to membership in club X. Membership in X might entail 
much more than just the right to participate in some of X’s decisions. Decisions regarding a subject 
matter with externalities are not the same as decisions of a foundational act. The right to member-
ship of a group does not directly follow from the fact of possibly being affected by the collective 
decision of that group. A group can constitute itself and legitimately consider the accommodation of 
the interests of non-members on grounds other than the right to membership. Members of two 
groups can make common decisions on issues regarding members of both groups; this does not 
imply that they have to merge membership into one group or that they have to extend formal mem-
bership to the members of the other group.  
Considered in this way, I thus argue that the ‘all possibly affected interests’ principle does 
not, per se, constitute the right to membership in a dêmos or any formalized group. In order to 
achieve that the presupposition of a member based principle of democratic decision making is 
necessary. At best, P7 only justifies an ad hoc right in collective decision making under certain 
circumstances. Hence, the principle is not an adequate basis for constituting a dêmos or any for-
malized group; it only determines a right to participation in a deliberation and decision. or a right to 
compensation for negative externalities of a decision. This is actually extensive and it has wide 
reaching consequences for political action in the world, but it does not solve the ‘who decides who 
is the people according to what criteria’ problem of democracy. Against this interpretation one can 
argue that the ‘all possibly affected interests’ principle enfranchises all actual and future humans 
for all possible decisions. The right to participation is thus permanent and general and no clubs 
other than humanity are allowed. This again leads to the problem that even living humanity as a 
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whole is a ‘club’ which violates the principle in the possibilist version, and in addition the only club 
which is allowed by the principle will exist only if one assumes all humans to live an infinite life (i.e. 
Kant’s postulate of immortality of practical reason). In any event, we are not dealing with a principle 
which is useful for constituting the dêmos.  
 
Forthly, P7 has a non-circular interpretation that also points to the presupposition of the group and 
membership. “All” can simply be read as “all members”. In this reading, the principle does not solve 
the problem of constituting the dêmos or any decision making group. It is rather a principle of de-
mocratization or, depending on the context, of restriction of decision making of a dêmos or of any 
group.49 When the principle is read in this manner, what concerns all members of a group (and 
only what concerns all members) should be decided by all members. The group and membership 
in the group is presupposed, not constituted. The ‘all affected interests’ principle in this reading 
does not suggest extending membership status or decision making rights beyond the group, it sim-
ply demands participatory decision making within societal groups. In this reading, the ‘all affected 
interests’ principle founds an associational notion of democracy which is critical of all non-
participatory decision making of groups if the interests of all members of the group are equally at 
stake. 
 
The bottom line of the analysis of the ’all affected interests’ principle is that it is a critical principle 
questioning the legitimacy of all dêmoi and asking for the extension of decision making rights be-
yond the scope of factual and finite dêmoi. It is not a principle which solves the problem of constitut-
ing the dêmos, far from it. It demands the deconstruction of any dêmos. In its associational reading, 
i.e. ‘affected interests of all members’, the ’all affected interests’ principle demands participatory 
decision making in all collective decisions of associations, in all “common activity”.50 It does not 
specifically apply to the dêmos and the political sphere. It is critical of hierarchical groups with no 
participatory decision making and critical of purely demos based democracy as it envisages democ-
ratic structuring of all corporate bodies.  
 
V. The Dêmos-Problem and the Plurality of Dêmoi 
1. We are almost back at square one: i) the dêmos cannot be constituted by democratic procedure. 
With Näsström (2007, 2011) we have to accept that the dêmos is an ongoing claim; ii) there is no 
competence, acceptance, or impact based democratic ideal known to us on the basis of which the 
dêmos can be constituted; iii) normative democratic theory is thus incomplete as far as I can see. 
However, we have learned that the notion of the ’unbounded dêmos’ is inadequate in the sense 
that a dêmos conceived in such terms is not capable of genuine voice and agency. The ‘un-
                                                 
49 Goodin 2007, pp. 62-3. 
50 “Common activity” as Carol Gould understands it (2004, p. 175-6; 1988, p. 78-85), does not stand for the 
dêmos but for any collective endeavour of a group of persons. That is why I do not think it reflects the 
dêmos-based notion of democracy. It is rather part of the associational notion. 
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bounded dêmos’ cannot therefore be invoked to legitimise decision making procedures, as for in-
stance has been proposed by Abidazeh (2008) in the case of migration. Furthermore, we can say 
that since no single dêmos can be constituted democratically, a plurality of dêmoi is in principle as 
legitimate as any unitary global dêmos. No dêmos can claim a democratic origin and we do not 
even know what such a democratic origin would look like in the first place. Liberal democratic 
dêmoi have thus no reason to deny the recognition of peoplehood to non-democratic dêmoi, as 
long as the latter respect basic human rights. A liberal law of peoples recognizing democratic and 
decent dêmoi is thus reasonable. Liberal demoi have to recognize that they themselves have illib-
eral origins and that decent dêmoi deserve the benefit of doubt regarding their future democratiza-
tion. 
 
2. To take this matter further, I would like to demonstrate that we can learn more about the solution 
of the dêmos problem by using the thought experiment of the simultaneous foundation of a plurality 
of dêmoi by a given group of individuals: 
 
The foundational process may last a given time t. We presuppose that the participants form a 
dêmos or dêmoi spontaneously. A possible outcome is that in the first phase a potential dêmos will 
be constituted with exclusions and that in the second phase the excluded will form further dêmoi. If 
at the end of t every individual is part of one of the dêmoi, we can say that all dêmoi were formed 
fulfilling a principle of non-exclusion and freedom of choice. However, the exclusions of individuals 
of some dêmoi might have been on the basis of racism, the excluded were just lucky enough to 
find another dêmos which did not exclude them. Hence, the solution to the problem of inclusion by 
multiple dêmoi is not per se the solution to the problem of constituting the dêmos democratically. 
However, the probability that total exclusion will be avoided increases in a setting with multiple 
dêmoi.  
We can see that with increasing numbers of individuals and increasing numbers of possible 
dêmoi to be founded, the percentage of people excluded by free choice of the participants will de-
crease. If we start with a group of 10 individuals and nine form a dêmos, one will be excluded with 
no group to go to. If we have 100 individuals and we exclude the same percentage of individuals 
as before (10%), we are left with ten individuals who have at least the option of forming on or sev-
eral further groups. If three persons form a further group (suppose we impose three as a minimum 
number for a group) and leave seven outside, the percentage of excluded compared to the number 
of initial individuals will be 3%, as opposed to 10% in the setting with 10 individuals. As the initial 
number of individuals increases, the number of possible dêmoi combinations increases. At the 
same time there is an increasing probability that the percentage of those who are excluded de-
creases. However, the absolute number of those who are excluded might be the same as in the 
setting with 10 people. It could occur that one is left out and cannot take part in the foundation of 
any dêmos no matter how large the number of individuals involved in the dêmoi foundation is. And 
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in a setting with a large number of individuals the timeframe t of dêmos formation will have to be 
extended since, all things being equal, more time will be needed to negotiate the constitution of 
dêmoi. This setting is preferable because the number of those who are freely included increases. 
The setting of a plurality of dêmoi formed by increasing numbers of individuals thus leads to 
pareto-better solutions of the problem of exclusion. At the same time, it allows us to conceive of the 
demos-formation on the basis of a procedure including a maximum number of members. This is 
more democratic than basing the solution of the demos problem on some abstract ideal that only 
caters to the idealistic and non-procedural understanding of “democratic”.  
 Regarding the acceptance-based solution to the dêmos problem we have seen that the 
main problems are the paradox of self-exclusion and the possibility of discriminatory exclusion. The 
setting with larger numbers and multiple dêmoi options eliminates, or at least mitigates, the nega-
tive consequence of the paradox of self-exclusion. This negative consequence of the paradox is 
that people will be forced to accept everybody else in order to be included themselves, thus un-
dermining free acceptance, or otherwise to choose members secretly. With the option to participate 
in the foundation of other dêmoi, the pressure to accept everybody in a group is mitigated by the 
probability of finding another group with people one can accept. Multiple dêmoi options in the foun-
dational process thus increases the probability of solutions that correspond to the criterion of free 
and open acceptance among members. In the case of discriminatory exclusions, the result is not 
so clear. If the cultural composition of the foundational group remains the same while being propor-
tionally augmented, increasing the numbers of individuals and dêmos options does not decrease 
the probability of discriminatory exclusions. It does, however, augment the options of the excluded 
to seek membership in other groups. Against this static notion of culture, we could argue that aug-
menting the numbers of dêmos founding individuals and dêmos options increases the possible 
combinations of cross-cutting cleavages among the participants, thus reducing the probability of 
confrontation based on reified discriminatory criteria. 
The implications of this thought experiment are manifold. One of them is that the ‘democ-
racy and size’ problem can be seen in a different light. From the point of view of the foundational 
dêmos-problem, i.e. the point of view of the basic legitimacy conditions of democracy as such, a 
small size of the demos, usually championed as more participatory and more democratic, is not 
necessarily beautiful. If only one small dêmos with a large number of excluded would exist, this 
would seem sub-optimal. Maybe small dêmoi are desirable if they can perform essential functions 
of the dêmos, but we can say that these small dêmoi are more legitimate if founded under condi-
tions in which excluded individuals have multiple options for dêmos formation.  
In general, we can conclude that it is the combination of the acceptance-based principle 
with the multiple-dêmoi setting that endows the single dêmos with more foundational legitimacy 
due to a more satisfactory solution of the dêmos-problem qua problem of free inclusion.  
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3. What happens to the competence and impact based principles under conditions of increased 
numbers of individuals with multiple dêmoi options? 
According to the CJT, a competence criterion is better fulfilled by larger numbers of mem-
bers of a single dêmos, provided that the average probability of ‘getting it right’ is >0.5. If we give 
people the option of forming multiple dêmoi, membership in a single dêmos might decrease along 
with the competence of its members, provided the single dêmos option would have fulfilled the 
criterion of the CJT. If the single dêmos has not fulfilled the criteria of the CJT, the formation of 
multiple dêmoi implies the option to organize the former minority of competent members in a 
smaller but competent dêmos fulfilling the CJT. In brief, if the criteria of the CJT are not met in the 
first place by the large single dêmos, which is quite probable in reality, the option of multiple dêmoi 
leads to the possibility of optimizing the composition of the dêmoi according to competence. This 
will give some dêmoi the possibility of achieving higher performance. This setting will be more fa-
vourable to development in self-contained dêmoi. However, the foundational multiple-dêmoi setting 
does not contribute anything to the solution of the problem of “who chooses the competent mem-
bers and criteria of competence” which we have diagnosed as one of the basic problems of com-
petence based solutions. This proposed solution only caters to an epistemic ideal of democracy 
and excludes participatory procedural elements from the original foundation of the dêmos. Nor 
does the thought experiment of a multiple-dêmoi setting solve the problem of internal fragmenta-
tion of the demos according to subject matter and required competence. 
 
Relating our foundational thought experiment to impact based principles we can say that increasing 
the number of potential dêmoi augments the possibility for individuals belonging to minority groups 
to defend their interests collectively and as independent dêmos. The problem of being potentially 
negatively affected by a decision is not necessarily best taken care off by the inclusion of all who 
are affected in the same dêmos. Imagine a foundational group to which belong ten billion persons 
of Han Chinese culture and 40 million Jews. To say that they all ought to belong to one single 
dêmos in order to protect themselves from being negatively affected by the decisions of the dêmos 
is wrong. In order to protect the minority of the affected it would be much better to let the Han Chi-
nese form a self-governed dêmos and the Jews form a self-governed dêmos and to let them sort 
out their differences according to the principle of mutual recognition of international sovereignty. 
Inclusion as response to affectedness only works for the majority group. For the minority group the 
formation of a single independent dêmos might be much better. In the case of a non-homogeneous 
foundational group of unequal numbers, the multiple dêmoi solution thus offers the possibility of 
better protection against being negatively affected by the foundation of a dêmos. Larger numbers of 
participating individuals and larger numbers of possible dêmoi thus have a favourable impact on the 
negative exclusionary consequences of an acceptance based principle of free dêmos constitution. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The different solutions to the dêmos-problem have different inherent problems none of which can 
be solved in a definite and satisfactory manner. We can also say that a large number of individuals 
with the option of forming a plurality of dêmoi facilitates the balancing of the combinations of the 
discussed principles in the formation of dêmoi. The acceptance-based solution to the dêmos prob-
lem is the least unsatisfactory because it does not beg the question of a further authority to be pre-
supposed. However it has other problems, such as possible racism and discrimination as well as 
the paradox of self exclusion and of necessity of secrecy.  We can conclude that the option of 
forming multiple dêmoi and the increase in numbers of foundational members does not solve the 
dêmos problem as such. It does not offer a formula according to which the dêmoi could be formed 
democratically. However, a dêmoi based setting mitigates the problems resulting from the applica-
tion of the acceptance-based solution we have discussed. It increases options of free choice in 
acceptance based settings of dêmos formations. Furthermore, the setting of multiple dêmoi re-
duces or even redeems factual exclusion, which is one of the enabling conditions of democratic 
participation. 
This overall conclusion is of some importance to normative political theory in general and to 
normative democratic theory in particular. Regarding the former it is interesting to note that political 
orders consisting of multiple dêmoi rather than of just one global dêmos have many normative ad-
vantages. Kant’s cosmopolitanism (rejecting the world state in the name of a plurality of dêmoi) or 
Rawls’ law of peoples thus stand on firmer ground than unitary conceptions of cosmopolitanism. 
Regarding democratic theory the result of this paper is interesting because the conception of de-
mocracy is often based on an introspective perspective of the single demos, be it a national or 
global dêmos. Going beyond the dêmos is often portrayed as either posing a fundamental threat to 
democracy51, or as implying the necessity of a single global dêmos and global democracy.52 But as 
I have tried to show here, the legitimacy of the dêmos itself is critically dependent on a relational 
setting of relatively open but independent dêmoi. The relations between dêmoi and the freedom of 
movement among them is thus not something which is added to ideal democratic theory as an ex-
ternal and foreign element reducing the legitimacy of a democracy. Rather, the norm which states 
that there should be multiple dêmoi that openly relate to each other is actually part of demos based 
democratic legitimacy. Democracy is therefore more legitimate conceived as demoicracy53, in other 
words, as a certain relational arrangement among separate democratic dêmoi. 
 
                                                 
51 Dahl 1999. 
52 Held 1995; Archibugi 1998; List & König-Archibugi 2010. 
53 Term coined by Nicolaïdis 2003 
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